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INTRODUCTION 
 
The decision of Mr Justice Lewison in Hanchett-Stamford v HM Attorney 
General and Dr William Johnston Jordan1 provides us with a useful analysis 
of the legal principles relating to the thorny issues of: (i) how unincorporated 
associations hold property; (ii) the applicability of the law of charities to 
unincorporated associations and (iii) the property rights of a declining 
membership upon the dissolution of such associations.  
In short, the Hanchett-Stamford case illustrates the relevance and 
applicability of the ‘contract-holding theory’ in relation to the ownership of 
property by unincorporated associations. At its most basic, the contract-
holding theory dictates that the assets of unincorporated associations2 (such as 
money in bank accounts, cash, land, personalty, shares etc) are held nominally 
by the club’s officers (such as the chairman and/or treasurer) on trust for the 
membership of the club, who, in turn, hold the equitable title to such assets 
under ‘a form of joint tenancy’. Further, the contract-holding theory dictates 
that, by their membership terms (as evidenced by the society’s 
constitution/rules), members contract with each other inter se. Implied into 
this contract are terms to the effect that (a) an individual member undertakes 
not to sever and claim his individual equitable share to the property/assets of 
the association and (b) in the event of his death or resignation, his equitable 
interest in the club’s assets remains unsevered and devolves to the remaining 
∗ LLB (Hons), PhD, ACArb, Barrister (Gray’s Inn), Senior Lecturer, University of 
Buckingham. 
1 Heard on February 20th 2008 at the Court of Chancery, Bristol District Registry with 
judgment being delivered on February 27th 2008. 
2  For example, Clubs and Societies. 
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members of the club or society. These implied contract terms keep the club 
intact, until such time as the membership decide (in accordance with the rules) 
to wind-up the club and distribute its assets. Additionally, the decision in 
Hanchett-Stamford also goes on to consider the ultimate destination of the 
ownership of the assets of an unincorporated association, where, over time, 
the club’s membership is reduced to a single person. 
 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
The Performing and Captive Animals Defence League (‘the League’) was 
founded in 1914. Between 1914 and 1934, it had adopted a written 
constitution, but this came to be lost by the time of legal proceedings. During 
the said period its affairs were managed, initially by an executive committee. 
However at the 1934 Annual General Meeting, the members decided to 
dispense with the executive committee and appoint a Director of the League, 
viz a Captain Edmund MacMichael, who had conferred on him the power to 
appoint an advisory committee. It was by no means clear that the AGM also 
decided to dispense with the constitution. 
 
OBJECTS OF THE LEAGUE 
 
The only extant evidence produced as to the objects of the League was a 
booklet, published in 1962. This declared that the primary objects of the 
League were to seek the enactment of two Bills, relating to the following: 
1. Performing Animals - The Performing Animals (Prevention of Cruelty) 
Bill - ‘To make illegal performances by animals involving cruelty in the 
‘training’ etc with just compensation to the trade’.3
2. Animal Films – The Protection of Animals (Cinematograph Bill), the 
aim of which was to make unprofitable the infliction of animal cruelty in the 
production of animal films shown on the British screen, whether for foreign 
manufacture or not. 
Further, the 1962 booklet went on to state that the above Bills were 
intended only to further assist in enforcing the then existing law, namely the 
3 In this connection, the League had, during its history, offered £1,000 to any person 
who under its constant supervision, succeeded in training any untrained animal to 
perform any circus trick on demand and without cruelty, which at all times was 
unclaimed. The League maintained that the trade had, by failing to answer the 
aforesaid thirty-year old challenge, publicly acknowledged the impossibility of 
training any kind of performing animal without cruelty. 
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Protection of Animals Act 1911.4 This Act rendered it illegal to cruelly beat, 
ill-treat, torture, infuriate, terrify or cause unnecessary suffering to any 
animal. Further still, the booklet declared that the League’s objects also 
involved the prevention of the establishment of municipal zoos and the 
prevention of the introduction into the United Kingdom of bullfights and 
rodeos. The booklet also encouraged League members to protest about 
television programmes, which depicted cruelty to animals.5
According to the 1962 booklet there were two categories of member, 
namely, life members and annual members, totalling at that time some 250 
people. Excess income was reinvested with gifts and legacies placed into an 
investment fund. Mr and Mrs Hanchett-Stamford joined the League in the 
mid-1960s as life members, both being relatively active in the League’s 
business.6 In this regard, the Hanchett-Stamfords’ worked with Dr Bill 
Jordan, (the then chief vet of RSPCA) in educating people about how to care 
for animals. Towards the end of the 1970s the work of the League declined 
and during this time Mr. Hanchett-Stamford took de facto control over the 
League’s assets, which continued to accumulate. In the 1990s the League 
purchased a property known as ‘Sid Abbey’, West Sid Road, Sidmouth, 
Devon, whereupon title to the same was registered in the names of Mr 
Hanchett-Stamford and a Mr Hervey7 as ‘trustees for the League’. This 
property was the principal wing of a nineteenth century Gothic House 
together with extensive grounds and a swimming pool. Mrs Hanchett-
Stamford had lived at this house for many years until her relocation to a 
nursing home.8 As at the date of the hearing, both registered proprietors were 
dead and Sid Abbey was valued at £675,000.  Additionally, the League also 
owned a portfolio of stocks and shares in the sum of £1.77 million. 
4 The League wished to make more effective the existing 1911 Act (in its attempt to 
prevent animal cruelty), in the context of the performing animals trade and as regards 
the use of animals in filmmaking. 
5 No attempt was ever made to register the League as a charity; however the issue as 
to whether the League had charitable status was considered by the Inland Revenue in 
1949. At this time the Inland Revenue concluded, in the light of the decision of the 
House of Lords in National Anti-Vivisection Society v IRC [1948] AC 31 that the 
League could not have charitable status as its principal objects were to bring about a 
change in the law. The League did not appeal this decision. 
6 To this end, Mr Hanchett-Stamford managed to persuade several local authorities 
not to let out land to travelling circuses. 
7 Mr Hervey also being a member of the League. 
8 Despite her relocation to a nursing home in Sidmouth no suggestion seems to have 
been made that she was unfit to take part in legal proceedings. The court made 
arrangements to take evidence from her at this nursing home. 
CASE COMMENTARY 
 110
                                                     
By the early 1990s the League’s activities dwindled and it no longer 
maintained membership records. From 2003, a Mr Redwood prepared the 
League’s annual accounts and tax returns and suggested that the League 
should take specialist advice with a view to winding itself up. Prior to his own 
death, Mr Hanchett-Stamford had suggested to Mr Redwood that the League’s 
assets be transferred to an active charity, which promoted animal welfare. To 
this end, it was agreed that the most suitable recipient would be the Born Free 
Foundation.9
Mr Hanchett-Stamford died in January 2006 and the current proceedings 
came about as a result of Mr and Mrs Hanchett-Stamford’s long-standing 
desire that the League’s assets be transferred to the Born Free Foundation. 
 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
 
In the High court Mrs Hanchett-Stamford sought an order to the effect that 
the work and objects of the League were charitable, together with an order 
appointing herself, along with her solicitor Ms Bevan, trustees of the funds of 
the League, with discretion to select a charity with similar objects to the 
League so as to receive those funds.10
It is noteworthy that as a matter of fact, Mr Justice Lewison found that 
just prior to Mr Hanchett-Stamford’s death in 2006, Mr and Mrs Hanchett-
Stamford were the only two living members of the League, with Mrs 
Hanchett-Stamford, as at the date of the hearing, being the sole surviving 
member of the League. 
 
LEGAL ISSUES  
 
Mr Justice Lewison was, inter alia, confronted with deciding the following 
issues viz: (i) Was the League a charity and (ii) If not a charity, what should 
happen to its assets?  
9 This was an active charity, which promoted animal welfare. 
10 The Attorney General was the only original named Defendant in the proceedings; 
however on 15th February 2008 Dr William Johnston-Jordan was made a party to the 
proceedings, claiming to be a life member of the League. He had come forward in 
response to a series of newspaper advertisements (placed in 2007), seeking to identify 
members of the League. Dr Jordan however failed to produce any cogent evidence of 
membership of the League, past or present. Further, Dr Jordan’s solicitor, by a letter 
dated 19th February 2008 expressly disclaimed on the part of Dr Jordan, any 
entitlement to the League’s assets. 
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In short, his lordship decided that the League was not a charity but rather 
an unincorporated association, with the property and assets thereof devolving 
to the last surviving member absolutely, namely Mrs Hanchett-Stamford.11
 
THE CHARITABLE STATUS CLAIM 
 
It was contended for Mrs Hanchett-Stamford that the property and assets 
of the League were held on a charitable trust. In this connection it had to be 
shown that such a trust fulfilled certain requirements, viz: (i) it was charitable 
in nature, being ‘within the spirit and intendment of the preamble to the 
Charitable Uses Act 1601’ (as interpreted by the courts and extended by 
statute) (ii) it promoted a public benefit of a nature recognised by the courts 
and (iii) its purposes were exclusively charitable. 
Mr Justice Lewison declared that the key element of any charitable trust 
was that it should exist for the benefit of the public, such a benefit being either 
direct or indirect. In this vein, his lordship declared that it was the element of 
indirect public benefit, which enabled many trusts, which had as their purpose 
the prevention of animal cruelty, to be accorded charitable status.12 
Accordingly, it was held that a trust that had as its sole object the prevention 
of cruelty to performing animals was recognised as being capable of being a 
charitable trust.13 The problem encountered by the League however, centred 
on the fact that at the heart of its objects was a desire to change the law. In 
this regard his lordship held that for various reasons, it had long been 
established that where the purposes or one of the purposes of a trust had been 
to bring about a change in the law, the courts had refused to recognise the 
trust as charitable. The reasons typically given for this approach being (i) that 
in such instance the court has no means of judging whether a proposed change 
in the law will or will not be for the public benefit, see Bowman v Secular 
Society Ltd14 per Lord Parker and (ii) the law cannot stultify itself by holding 
that it is for the public benefit that the law itself should be changed and each 
court must decide on the principle that the law is right as it stands, see 
11 This conclusion obviously rendered irrelevant any trusteeship issues relating to Mrs 
Hanchett-Stamford. 
12 See Re Wedgwood [1915] 1 Ch 113, where it was suggested that a gift for the 
benefit and protection of animals was one which tended to promote and encourage 
kindness towards them, discouraged cruelty and necessarily stimulated humane and 
generous sentiments in man towards animals. This, in turn, thus promoted feelings of 
humanity and morality generally, thus elevating the human race. 
13 In this regard his lordship recognised that this position had, in recent times, been 
expressly recognised by virtue of s 2(2)(k) Charities Act 2006. 
14 [1917] AC 406. 
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National Anti-Vivisection Society v IRC15 per Lords Wright and Simonds, and 
(iii) if the courts sanction as charitable trusts those with the purpose of 
changing the law, the courts would be trespassing on the role of the 
legislature, which bears the sole responsibility for evaluating the need for such 
changes, see Mc Govern v AG16 per Slade J and Southwood v AG17 per 
Chadwick LJ. His lordship did recognise however that there was a distinction 
between the purposes or objects of a charity and the means by which it 
promoted those objects or purposes, it being the case that the Charity 
Commission can issue guidance to charities and trustees about the extent to 
which they can engage in campaigning, including campaigns to change the 
law.  
In the final analysis however his lordship was of the view that the bedrock 
principle was that an organisation set up for the purpose of changing the law 
could not achieve charitable status. His lordship accepted that some of the 
Leagues objects relating to the prevention of animal cruelty were already 
enshrined in the then relevant existing law,18 however other objects of the 
League sought to further change the law,19 viz the introduction of a ban on 
performing animals, albeit with ‘just compensation to the trade’. His lordship 
opined that such a change would be on a par with banning fox hunting or the 
farming of mink. Therefore his lordship was of the view that the objects of the 
League were not charitable. 
It was further contended that even if the League, by virtue of its objects, 
was not charitable from the time of its inception, it had over the years become 
charitable in nature, either by virtue of changes in the law or as a result of the 
decision of Mr and Mrs Hanchett-Stamford to transfer the League’s assets to 
the Born Free Foundation.  
Cited in support of the first contention was the General Medical Council’s 
application for charitable status. The GMC was established by the Medical 
Act 1858 and incorporated by the Medical Council in 1862. Its principal 
objects were to keep and publish a register of qualified medical practitioners, 
to exercise oversight over medical studies and examinations and to publish the 
British Pharmacopaeia. It also had power to strike-off practitioners in certain 
circumstances. Further, only medical practitioners registered with the GMC 
could sue for their fees. The Inland Revenue decided that the GMC had not 
been established for exclusively charitable purposes and the GMC’s appeal 
against that decision was dismissed by the High Court and Court of Appeal.20 
15 [1948] AC 31. 
16 [1982] Ch 321. 
17 The Times 18th July 2000.  
18 By virtue of the Cruelty to Animals Act 1911 (thus not involving any change). 
19 To reflect the League’s own ‘wider concept of cruelty’. 
20 See General Medical Council v IRC [1928] All ER 252. 
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At these hearings it was held that the GMC was principally established for 
benefit of the medical profession and that any benefit to the public was an 
incidental and secondary benefit, essentially because only a registered 
practitioner could sue for his fees.  
In 2001 however the Charity Commission allowed the GMC to be 
registered as a charity on the basis that there had been sufficient changes in 
the relevant legal framework to the constitution and activities of the GMC and 
the social and economic context within which the GMC operated. It was 
further stated that the GMC was established for the charitable purpose of 
ensuring proper standards in the practice of medicine and that the introduction 
of the NHS had transformed the environment within which medical services 
were provided (reducing the need for medical practitioners to sue for their 
fees) and that the general regulation of the profession was in the public 
interest.  
Building on this example, it was argued for the claimant that changes 
brought in concerning animal welfare by virtue of the Animal Welfare Act 
2006 and the explicit recognition of the advancement of animal welfare as a 
charitable purpose by the Charities Act 2006, s 2 (2)(k) amounted to the 
necessary societal changes which now rendered the objects of the League 
charitable. His lordship however dismissed this argument on the basis that 
these changes were not major legal changes of substance and did not prohibit 
the performing or training of animals, which the League had as its principal 
object.  
As to the second argument, his lordship dismissed the suggestion that the 
League’s assets had become charitable by virtue of Mr and Mrs Hanchett-
Stamford’s decision to transfer the League’s assets to the Born Free 
Foundation, (an existing registered charity). As to the real property asset of 
the League, namely Sid Abbey, his lordship held that there was no written 
evidence of this decision and hence no express declaration of trust in favour 
of the Born Free Foundation, complicit with the formality requirements of 
Law of Property Act 1925, s 53 (1)(b).21 As to the other assets of the League, 
no evidence existed suggesting any such express declaration of trust. Further, 
his lordship stated that there was no evidence suggesting a binding contract 
between the League’s remaining members as to the distribution of the 
League’s assets for charitable purposes, so as to change the objects of the 
League, in order to render them exclusively charitable. In conclusion therefore 
his lordship was of the view that the League was never a charity nor had it 
ever become one. 
 
21 Law of Property Act 1925, s 53(1)(b) declares that: “a declaration of trust 
respecting any land or any interest therein must be manifested and proved by some 
writing signed by some person who is able to declare such a trust or by his will.” 
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THE LEAGUE AS AN UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION 
 
In his judgment, Mr Justice Lewison considered the League an 
unincorporated association. To this end, as to the League’s asset holding, he 
relied upon the famous dictum of Cross J in Neville Estates Ltd v Madden22 
who stated that a gift to an unincorporated association could have one of three 
effects:  
 
1. It may be a gift to members of the association at the relevant date 
as joint tenants so that any member could sever his share and 
claim it, whether or not he continues to be a member; 
2. It may be a gift to the existing members not as joint tenants but 
subject to their respective contractual rights and liabilities towards 
one another as members of the association - in such instance a 
member cannot sever his share and it will accrue to the other 
members on his death or resignation, even though such members 
include persons who became members after the gift took effect;  
3. The terms or circumstances of the gift or the rules of the 
association may show that the property in question is not to be at 
the disposal of the members for the time being but it is to be held 
in trust for the purposes of the association as a quasi-corporate 
body – in such case the gift will fail unless the association is a 
charitable body. 
 
His lordship declared that as the League already had assets, there was no 
gift or bequest to League as such, therefore the third approach to construing 
the asset holding was inapplicable. Further, his lordship held that analysing 
the League’s asset holding in terms of the first method of construction would 
lead to absurdity, in that, if adopted, this axiom of construction it would allow 
for every member of any club to sever their entitlement and claim an 
individual share of the assets. If this occurred clubs would be under 
permanent threat of being broken up in this fashion and would cease to exist. 
Therefore his lordship held that it was the second ‘contract-holding theory’, 
which provided for the most appropriate analysis. In following the judgment 
of Brightman J in Re Recher,23 the second approach to construing the asset 
holding of the League involved viewing those assets as “an accretion to the 
funds which are the subject-matter of the contract which such members have 
22 [1962] Ch 832. This threefold classification was adopted by Brightman J in Re 
Recher’s Will’s Trusts [1972] Ch 526 and by Lawrence Collins J in Hunt v McLaren 
[2006] EWHC 2386 (Ch). 
23  Ibid. 
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made inter se”.24 His lordship therefore concluded that the members for the 
time being of an unincorporated association were entitled to its assets, subject 
however to the contractual arrangements (albeit implied from the rules of the 
society) between them, the members holding ‘a form’ of beneficial ownership, 
in the sense that the property belonged to them.25 His lordship then, in 
accepting the reasoning of Walton J in Re Bucks Constabulary Widows and 
Orphans Fund Friendly Society (No 2)26 concluded that members of 
unincorporated associations had contractual rather than equitable rights and 
that on death or resignation, members ceased to have any interest in the assets 
of the unincorporated association, this being not so much a result of equitable 
ownership rights but rather as a result of being a facet of the contractual 
relations between members. His lordship also agreed with the judgment of 
Walton J in the Bucks Constabulary case to the effect that an unincorporated 
association would end when reduced to its last member, the logic being that if 
the members' rights are founded in contract, the contract must cease to bind 
once there is no other party to enforce it. However, unlike the decision of 
Walton J in the Bucks Constabulary case, Mr Justice Lewison took the view 
that where an unincorporated association was reduced to its last member, the 
assets should not go to the Crown by way of bona vacantia. Relying on the 
Court of Appeal ruling in Cunnack v Edwards27 and the Irish Appeal Court 
ruling in Tierny v Tough,28 his lordship held that the assets of an 
unincorporated association belonged to the individual members. In this regard 
his lordship cited Pennycuick J in Abbatt v Treasury Solicitor29 who stated: 
24 In Re Rechers Will Trusts (above n 22) Brightman J declared that “a legacy …[left 
to an unincorporated association]…is a gift to the members beneficially not as joint 
tenants or as tenants in common so as to entitle each member to an immediate 
distributive share, but as an accretion to the funds of which are the subject matter of 
the contract which the members have made inter se.” 
25 In this connection his lordship drew support from the dicta of Brightman J in Re 
Rechers Wills Trusts (above n 22) and from the decision of Walton J in Re Bucks 
Constabulary Widows and Orphans Fund Friendly Society (No 2) [1979] 1 WLR 937. 
Further his lordship stated at para 31: “…Megarry and Wade on Real Property (6th ed 
para 9-095) accuse the courts of having developed “a new form of property holding 
by unincorporated associations in order to escape from the technical difficulties of the 
classic models of joint tenancies and tenancies in common. I do not think that the 
courts have purported to do so and in view of the proviso to the Law of Property Act 
1925, s 4(1), it is difficult to see how they lawfully could at least in relation to 
land…So the ownership of assets by unincorporated associations must somehow fit 
into accepted structures of property ownership.” 
26 Ibid. 
27 [1896] 2 Ch 679. 
28 [1914] 1 I R 142.  
29 [1969] 1 WLR 561. 
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“…It is an implied term of the contract of membership of a members’ club 
that an individual member is precluded from obtaining the realisation and 
distribution of the club property so long as the club functions. But once 
the club ceases to function the reason for this disappears and the right of 
the existing members must I think crystallise once and for all.” 
 
In his concluding comments his lordship then stated that the ‘thread’ 
which ran through so many of the cases on asset holding by unincorporated 
associations, was the fact that on dissolution, members were entitled to the 
assets free from any such contractual restriction. His lordship then suggested 
that whilst an unincorporated association was alive, the property rights of the 
members did not fit into any accepted property law model of joint tenancy or 
tenancy in common, but were rather “a sub-species of joint tenancy”, which 
took effect subject to any contractual restrictions applicable as between 
members. Further, in his lordship’s view the above authorities demonstrated, 
that upon agreement/permanent cessation,30 (or where the membership fell 
below two), the members of a dissolved association had a beneficial interest 
in its assets. In applying this reasoning, his lordship then found that the 
League continued to operate until the death of Mr Hanchett-Stamford in 
January 2006, after which its membership fell below two. The result of this 
being that the sole surviving member of the League, namely Mrs Hanchett-
Stamford, inherited the assets of the League. This, in turn, entitled her to be 
registered both as proprietor of Sid Abbey and as shareholder of the League’s 
shares.31
 
COMMENT 
 
Mr Justice Lewison’s ruling in the Hanchett-Stamford case is interesting 
in several respects. First, the decision is very much in line with the recent 
authority of Re Horley Town Football Club32 and indeed previous case law.33 
30 In Re GKN Bolts and Nuts Ltd Sports and Social Club [1982] 2 All E R 855, noted 
at [1983] Conveyancer 315, Megarry VC intimated that a ‘spontaneous dissolution’ of 
an unincorporated association could occur through inactivity where the inactivity was 
so prolonged that ‘dissolution’ was only reasonable inference to draw. 
31 The assets had thus become hers absolutely. She had attained a monopoly of 
control over them. Accordingly, his lordship noted that she was then free to so as she 
wished with the assets, which included giving the same to the Born Free Foundation. 
32 [2006] EWHC 2386 (Ch), [2006] WTLR 1817. In Re Horley Town Football Club; 
Hunt v McLaren [2006] All ER (D) 34, High Court, the facts were as follows:  In 
1948, a Major Jennings, the then President of the Horley Town Football Club, (‘the 
Club’), settled land by deed on trust ‘to secure a permanent sports ground for the 
Club’. In May 2002 the land was sold to a developer for almost £4m. The trustees 
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Like these earlier decisions, it again confirms the applicability of the 
‘contract-holding theory’34 as the appropriate approach to analysing the 
holding of assets and property by unincorporated associations.35  
Secondly, the decision is significant in that like the dictum of Walton J in 
the Re Bucks Constabulary case,36 Mr Justice Lewison endorses the view that 
in the event of an unincorporated association’s membership falling below two, 
such an association ceases to exist. It then reinforces the point that upon the 
death of any member, that member ceases to have any share in the assets of 
used the proceeds to purchase another site for £850,000 and to construct a Clubhouse 
and ancillary facilities amounting to approximately £2.2m. This new sports complex 
was subject to certain restrictive covenants, which limited its use to sports and leisure. 
As a consequence, the land was worth less than the amount spent on it. The rules of 
the Club made provision for several varieties of membership ranging from current full 
members to temporary and associate members. The trustees applied to the Court for 
(i) directions concerning the basis on which they held the assets of the Club and (ii) a 
ruling as to the proper construction of the rules of the Club. After reviewing the 
authorities, the High Court held that the Deed should be construed as a gift to the 
Club, as a ‘contract-holding gift to the Club and its members for the time being’ under 
the ruling in Neville Estates v Madden (above n 22). Further, it was held that a gift to 
or in trust for an unincorporated association might take effect as a gift to the existing 
members, not as joint tenants but subject to their respective contractual rights and 
liabilities towards each other as members of the association. In this event, it then held 
that each member could not sever his share and it would accrue to the other members 
on his death or resignation. It was further held, as a matter of construction, that the 
beneficial ownership of the assets of the Club subsisted in the ‘full members’ but not 
the temporary and associate members. Accordingly, the trustees held the assets on 
bare trusts for the full members. It followed therefore that the members acquired the 
assets of the Club subject to the current rules and could unanimously or by a general 
meeting call for the assets to be transferred.  See P Luxton “Gifts to Clubs: Contract 
Holding is Trumps” [2007] Conveyancer 274. 
33 See Neville Estates Ltd v Madden (above n 22) and Re Recher (above n 22). 
34 As originally promulgated in Neville Estates Ltd v Madden (ibid) 
35 The ‘contract holding theory’ (or ‘the accretion to assets’ model), in the last 40 or 
so years, has become the preferred and perhaps most convenient way in which to 
construe the holding of assets by unincorporated associations generally, as opposed to 
other approaches, such as those involving a purpose trust approach (see Re 
Drummond [1914] 2 Ch 90, Re Price [1943] 2 All ER 505), or outright gift to 
members as joint tenants whereupon any one member can sever his share (see Leahy v 
AG for New South Wales [1959] AC 457 (PC), Cocks v Manners (1871) LR 12 Eq 
574 (HC)), or the mandate/agency theory (see Conservative and Unionist Central 
Office v Burrell [1982] 1 WLR 522  (HC)). See generally J Warburton “The Holding 
of Property by Unincorporated Associations” [1985] Conveyancer 318. 
36 Above n 25. 
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the association by virtue of the ius accrescendi applying in favour of the 
surviving members (as reinforced by the contract between members).37
Thirdly, by his judgment, it is significant that his lordship expressly 
overturns the suggestion made by Walton J in the Re Bucks Constabulary case 
to the effect that in the event of the death of the second-to-last member of an 
unincorporated association, the Crown picks up any assets remaining, by 
virtue of the doctrine of bona vacantia, albeit through the Attorney General. In 
this connection, Mr Justice Lewison relying on dicta in Abbatt v Treasury 
Solicitor38 asserts that the remaining member inherits the assets. It is 
submitted that this is the better view and represents an approach, which is 
more likely to be in keeping with the spirit and substance of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.39
Finally, the reasoning underpinning the judgment in the Hanchett-
Stamford case nicely illustrates the legal principles governing the asset 
holding and dissolution of unincorporated associations and, in the light of 
earlier case law, demonstrates a consistency of approach to what is a 
complicated area of property law.40
37 The same approach was also held to apply to instances of resignation of members, 
no doubt as a result of such members being ‘a sub-species of joint tenant’. Upon 
resignation, it could be argued that a member effectively ‘releases’ his ‘equitable 
interest to the remaining membership, see s 36(2), Law of Property Act 1925. 
38 [1969] 1 WLR 561. 
39 Article 1 of the First Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms guarantees the peaceful enjoyment of possessions; it states: 
“…No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and 
subject to the conditions provided for by law…” In this regard, in the Hanchett-
Stamford case, Mr Justice Lewison stated: “…On the face of it for one of two 
members of an unincorporated association to be deprived of his share in the assets of 
the association by reason of the death of the other of them, without any compensation, 
appears to be a breach of this article. It is also difficult to see what public interest is 
served by the appropriation by the state of that member’s share in the association’s 
assets. This…provides another reason why the conclusion that a sole surviving 
member of the unincorporated association, while still alive cannot claim its assets, is 
unacceptable…” 
40 Some writers such as Todd have suggested that the best way to resolve some of the 
problems surrounding asset holding by unincorporated associations would be for UK 
law to allow trusts for the purposes of the association to be valid, along the lines of 
that upheld in the case of Re Denley [1969] 1 Ch 373. Such a reform it is argued 
would not give rise to any enforcement problems because of the locus standi of the 
membership in this regard. A possible difficulty with such a model may remain 
however within the current constraints of the law against perpetuities in relation to 
land holding /asset holding.  In which case it has been suggested that the solution lies 
in a liberalisation of the rule against perpetuities, so as to allow for the ‘private 
purpose trust’ device to regulate the asset holding of unincorporated associations. 
